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Weak Brain in Action.

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Oh, while you're at it, eat your heart out! Thank you.

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While I was engaged in a tete-a-tete with a couple of friends, a Yoruba lady with her mother and little ones were having a hard time getting over a culvert I did what the Igbo do best I broke my conversation and ran to their rescue. It was the Igbo in me and all Igbo that propelled me as I am sure she and her family are not enemies of mine. Can a Yoruba/Benin speak similarly? Hmmm?

...since I got onboard

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While I was engaged in a tete-a-tete with a couple of friends, a Yoruba lady with her mother and little ones were having a hard time getting over a culvert I did what the Igbo do best I broke my conversation and ran to their rescue. It was the Igbo in me and all Igbo that propelled me as I am sure she and her family are not enemies of mine. Can a Yoruba/Benin speak similarly? Hmmm? -MeBiafran

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I don't care what it is, he has my vote and my back .

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The BITTER TRUTH which most of you so-called "Biafra liberators" find hard to swallow is that your Biafran house came crumble not because the Emeagwalis caused it to be so, rather, it has more to do with your refusal to seek and adopt a broad-based and CONCENSUS approach at dealing with Ndigbo's acknowledged economic and political dislocation.
Therefor, my message to you guys is that maligning, blakmailing or attacking the person of the the likes of Emeagawali will not change the mind of people like Nwa Aro who know where the river started polluting.

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Originally posted by Ezeka Onu:
Let's post that case here for future reference.

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


-------------------------------------------------



-------------------------------------------------



UNPUBLISHED October 29, 1999 No. 209841 Washtenaw Circuit Court Court of Claims Nos. 96-007465 CZ 96-016329 CM


PHILIP EMEAGWALI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF
REGENTS, BENJAMIN WYLIE, ERDOGAN LC
GULARI, NIKOLAOS KATOPODES, JOHN H. D'ARMS, STEVEN WRIGHT, and LINDA
ABRIOLA,

Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Gage, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's grant of
defendants' motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

The events underlying this appeal involve plaintiff's attempt to
obtain a doctorate degree from the University of Michigan. In 1987, the
university accepted plaintiff as a precandidate into its civil engineering
doctoral program. Plaintiff received a fellowship that would pay for his
tuition and provide a monthly stipend. To obtain their degrees, doctorate
students had to satisfy several requirements published by the university's
civil engineering department. After their acceptance as precandidates,
students had to take "at least one full term of graduate level studies
beyond the Master's Degree level," and were expected to maintain above
average grades. On completing a certain extent of course work and achieving
a certain graduate grade point average, generally no later than twelve
months after precandidate admission, precandidate students then took a
qualifying examination consisting of both written and oral portions
evaluated by at least four graduate professors. Students who passed the
examination achieved "applicant" status; those who did not pass might or
might not be reexamined. Successful applicant students then chose "a thesis
topic in consultation with the faculty member chosen by the student to
serve as Chairman of the Dissertation Committee." After the student
obtained committee approval for his proposed course work and thesis
research program, the student was required to pass a preliminary
examination, research and write a dissertation, defend the dissertation in
a final oral examination, and publish the dissertation.

-1-

Between 1987 and 1991, plaintiff completed approximately thirty-five
University of Michigan graduate credit hours. In the course of his studies,
he applied for and won a 1989 Gordon Bell Prize, which "recognizes
significant achievements in the application of supercomputers to scientific
and engineering problems." Plaintiff did not take his qualifying
examination until May 1991. He failed this examination, was given an
opportunity to retake the examination in July 1991, and failed this
examination as well.

During 1990 and 1991, plaintiff expressed to a dean and associate dean
in the college of engineering concerns that defendant Benjamin Wylie, the
civil engineering department's chairperson, was blocking plaintiff's
progress toward his doctorate degree. Plaintiff believed that his graduate
course work and his completed dissertation entitled him to sit for his
qualifying examination, but that Wylie had "been evasive about setting
specific examination dates" for plaintiff because he was African-American.
In June of 1991, plaintiff applied for a joint doctoral program in civil
engineering and scientific computing. In August 1991, defendant Erdogan
Gulari, the associate dean for academic affairs in the engineering college,
discussed with plaintiff the possibility of pursuing a program through the
Laboratory of Scientific Computing (LaSC). An August 14, 1991 memorandum
prepared by Gulari reflects his and plaintiff's agreement that plaintiff
had not satisfied the requirements to pass the civil engineering qualifying
examination. Gulari suggested that if plaintiff would provide Gulari his
written dissertation by October 1, 1991, Gulari would suggest several
experts, most of whom would be external to the university, to evaluate
plaintiff's work and recommend whether it merited a doctorate degree.
Gulari's memorandum noted that the graduate school would likely have to
waive some candidacy requirements for plaintiff to qualify as a scientific
computing doctorate candidate.

Plaintiff submitted his dissertation on July 24, 1992. The university
faculty members who ultimately reviewed the dissertation did not view it
favorably. On June 17, 1993, Gulari notified plaintiff that the engineering
college faculty had concluded that his thesis was not worthy of a doctorate
degree.

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging that defendants had
discriminated against him in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., and that
defendants had breached a contract to award plaintiff a doctorate degree
when he had satisfied his own contract obligations.1

I

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his civil
rights claims given that evidence existed showing that defendants
discriminated against him. We review de novo the trial court's grant or
denial of summary disposition. When reviewing a motion for summary
disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must review the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The moving party bears the
initial burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence. The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue
of disputed fact exists. The nonmoving party may not rely on mere
allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to
set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Summary disposition is properly granted pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) if the evidence

-2-

_______________________________
reveals there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460
Mich 446, 454-455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).

The ELCRA prohibits educational institutions from engaging in
discriminatory behavior. MCL 37.2402; MSA 3.548(402).2 A person claiming
discrimination must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination,
either by showing intentional discrimination or disparate treatment.
Meagher v Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 709; 565 NW2d 401
(1997). Intentional discrimination is proven by showing that (1) the
plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) an adverse decision was
made affecting the plaintiff, (3) the decision maker had a predisposition
to discriminate against members of the protected class, and (4) the
decision maker acted on that predisposition in reaching the decision.
Reisman v Regents of Wayne State University, 188 Mich App 526, 538; 470
NW2d 678 (1991). To prove disparate treatment, the plaintiff has to show
that he was a member of a protected class and that he was treated
differently than persons of a different class for the same or similar
conduct. Id. A plaintiff claiming that a decision was discriminatorily
motivated must produce some facts from which a factfinder could reasonably
infer unlawful motivation. Fonseca v Michigan State Univ, 214 Mich App 28,
31; 542 NW2d 273 (1995).

A

In this case, plaintiff showed that he was a member of a protected
class, and that defendants made a decision that adversely affected him.
There was no evidence in the record, however, that any of the defendants
had a predisposition to discriminate against African-Americans or, even
assuming such predispositions existed, that the defendants acted on these
predispositions. The only indication of predisposition that plaintiff
presented was his own statement in a letter to Peter Banks, an engineering
college dean, that he felt defendant Benjamin Wylie had been unduly harsh
in his treatment of African-American graduate students in the engineering
college. This statement represents only plaintiff's opinion and does not
illustrate that Wylie or any other defendant was predisposed to
discriminate against African-Americans, or that defendants acted on any
such predisposition in considering plaintiff's participation in the
doctoral program.

B

Plaintiff also contends that he made out a prima facie case of
disparate treatment by showing that he completed the requirements for a
scientific computing degree and that students of other races who completed
the program had received degrees. Again, however, no evidence exists in the
record that defendants treated plaintiff differently from others who twice
failed the civil engineering qualifying examination.

Furthermore, plaintiff's contentions that he completed the doctorate
requirements in scientific computing and that the trial court made
irrelevant observations concerning the civil engineering program's
requirements are not supported by the record. Plaintiff was admitted into
the civil engineering department's doctoral program. While a joint degree
was available in civil engineering and scientific computing, the
acquisition of the scientific computing doctorate depended on plaintiff's
satisfaction of his home department's requirements, which included the

-3-

qualifying examination. Moreover, the record contains no official
acceptance of plaintiff into the joint program. With respect to plaintiff's
suggestion that he satisfied the scientific computing doctorate
requirements,3 Gulari's August 14, 1991 memorandum indicated that to
determine plaintiff's potential eligibility for a scientific computing
doctorate, he would assemble a committee to examine plaintiff's
dissertation. While plaintiff was supposed to submit his dissertation no
later than October 1, 1991, he failed to do so until mid-1992.
Additionally, he failed to receive favorable reviews of his dissertation.

C

Plaintiff raises several other alleged instances of discrimination,
including (1) that he was denied a supercomputer account while white
students received these, (2) that defendants evicted him from his civil
engineering department office, (3) that he applied for a faculty position
but was never interviewed, (4) that defendants intentionally misinformed
the graduate school that plaintiff was no longer enrolled, thus terminating
plaintiff's fellowship, (5) that defendants conspired to block plaintiff's
admission to the scientific computing program, and that a memo concerning
plaintiff's application for this program represented direct evidence of
racial animus, and (6) that defendants used different criteria to evaluate
plaintiff's dissertation than they used in evaluating the work of other
students. First, plaintiff produced nothing other than his own
unsubstantiated allegation to show that white students in his same position
received supercomputer access. Second, plaintiff's only evidence of
defendants' involvement in his removal from his civil engineering
department office constituted hearsay from an anonymous source; moreover,
plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever that any action by defendants in
this respect derived from racial animus. Third, plaintiff provided no
specific information concerning any position for which he applied, nor any
information regarding who interviewed or hired for the position, thus
failing to satisfy his burden of proof. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225
Mich App 601, 607-608; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). Fourth, plaintiff admitted in
his deposition that he received all ten terms of his fellowship, and
plaintiff is bound by this admission. Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518,
520; 316 NW2d 255 (1982). Fifth, even assuming arguendo that defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to block plaintiff's entry into the scientific
computing doctoral program, absolutely no evidence presented connects
defendants' action to plaintiff's race. While an email copy revealing that
someone apparently connected with LaSC "can't stand him [plaintiff]"
represents evidence of animus, it is not evidence of racial animus. Lastly,
plaintiff simply failed to produce evidence substantiating that white
students received more extensive or better quality faculty feedback
concerning their dissertations.

D

Plaintiff also raises for the first time on appeal several more ELCRA
issues, including that he received unfavorable grades on his course work
and qualifying examinations in retaliation for having filed complaints of
discrimination, that defendants lied about plaintiff's academic record, and
that he was denied various masters degrees. Plaintiff did not raise any of
these issues, however, in either his complaint or his response to
defendants' motion for summary disposition; plaintiff thus failed to
preserve these arguments for our review. Driver v Hanley (After Remand),
226 Mich App 558, 563-564; 575 NW2d 31 (1997). We have nonetheless examined
these claims and find them unsupported by the record.

-4-

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in granting
summary disposition regarding plaintiff's ELCRA count.

II

Plaintiff next claims the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition of his breach of contract action. Plaintiff argues that the
court erred in finding that the August 14, 1991 memorandum drafted by
Gulari4 was not a contract for a doctorate degree. A valid contract
requires a meeting of the minds on all material facts and essential terms.
A meeting of the minds is determined by an objective standard, by looking
to the express words of the parties and their visible acts, not their
subjective states of mind. Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp, 194
Mich App 543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992). While plaintiff interprets the
memorandum as a contract for a Ph.D., no reasonable interpretation of the
memorandum supports this conclusion. The memorandum contains no unequivocal
language obligating defendants to grant plaintiff a degree in exchange for
some