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There are indications that the ruling Peoples Democratic Party may find a proactively optional solution to the deepening political crisis in Rivers State over the Party’s intra-personality power play and intrigues on who becomes the gubernatorial flag bearer in the April 2007 general polls.
This anticipated move, it is believed, will also be a panacea for the social problem of deviant behaviour by the raging restiveness of militant Niger Delta Youths, as the choice would pacify the rag-tagged militants ahead of the crucial nationwide general elections, if the right choice of the candidate from the domain of key militants of the Niger Delta region. According to Inside politics findings, the Presidency may have the option of considering the choice of Alabo Paworiso Samuel-Horsfall as the Peoples Democratic Party governorship flag bearer ahead of the April 2007 general elections, if the Party is to retain its hold on power in Rivers State, given the reinforced realignments form the Accord Party and the Action Congress. It would be recalled that the non-endorsement of the PDP flag bearer in Rivers State, Rt. Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi, last Saturday by President Olusegun Obasanjo during the South South zonal flag off of the Yar’Adua-Jonathan joint ticket may have signalled a feud that enveloped the Party in the oil-rich Niger Delta state. However, following the voluntary withdrawal from the Rivers State governorship race, a night before the congress, the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Austin Opara whose decision was said to have been largely influenced by the membership profile of his own caucus and kitchen cabinet events at the Congress ushered in a sharp twist in the line-up of the political interests aggregation, compelling a protest walk-out by seven other governorship contestants. The protesting contestants whose individual aspirations of actualising their set goals of emerging as future flag bearers of the Peoples Democratic party in Rivers State come 2007 include; Senator Ibiapuye Martyns-YHelloew, two-time Senator, former University don and Psychiatrist; Alabo Paworiso-samuel Horsfall, two-time Commissioner in Governor Odili’s cabinet and former Federal Lawmaker in the House of Representatives, Chief David Briggs who also was a two-time Commissioner in the same administration, Mr. Dumo Lulu-Briggs, a businessman turned politician; Chief Kio Bestman, Mr. Chris Orji, a personal aide to Austin Opara who only resigned his appointment and joined the race with his boss barely a month when Opara declared his interest for the governorship position and the last is Chief Isaac Wonwu whose political credentials appear not too visible. The protest walk-out by these seven contestants provided a leeway for Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi to win in a landslide victory at the congress. While all had seemed well with the victory song of the Speaker’s election, the euphoria and excitement became ephemeral as officials of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) came calling on the State Government. As the heat over the EFCC investigations continued and following the experiences and lasting impressions which Governor Peter Odili, passed through at the Presidential Primaries, the Peoples Democratic Party National hierarchy drama-tically de-enlisted Amaechi as the state Party flag bearer. This development opened avenues for Odili to start shopping for a replacement for Amaechi and suddenly found the person of Barrister Celestine Omehia who hails from the same local Community as Amaechi. Governor Odili’s preferen-ce and subsequent choice of Celestine Omehia further compounded the problem in Rivers PDP. The governor was asked by the authorities in Abuja to present two names and ordinarily the PDP Chieftains including the seven aspirants who staged a walk-out had expected that Governor Odili would have picked from the list of the cleared aspirants as a way of pacifying them. But he opted for Omehia. Findings in Rivers State also show that the mechanical solidarity which the governor is giving to Omehia as the possible replacement for Speaker Amaechi may be explained by the thoughts of a candidate whom he can control besides doing his biddings. It was also gathered that the presentation of Prince Tonye Princewill by the Action Congress and Chief Bekinbo Soberekmon of Accord Party, all as the governorship flag bearers of their parties in the polls in Rivers State, what will most likely cost the PDP its victory is if a candidate from the same Riverine area as these two fag bearers with strong and formidable democratic and electoral is not presented by the PDP.
___________________ achieve Biafra and show the difference Posts: 643 | From: Los Angeles, CA | Registered: Nov 2002
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The Plan: nigerian government Igbo containment strategy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa , 1969-1972 Released by the Office of the Historian
5 August 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Nigeria : The Federal Military Government's War Aims vis-a-vis the Ibos
I. The Federal Government's War Aims
1. The federal government's immediate war aim is to establish federal control over Biafra . The federal authorities are willing to negotiate an end to the war, but we see no indications that Lagos would be satisfied with anything but a settlement on its own terms, including a renunciation of secession by the Biafrans and the establishment of federal authority--probably in the form of federal occupation forces--over the whole of the former Eastern Region. The federal government almost certainly would not accept General Ojukwu in any leadership position, and many Nigerians might well demand his death or imprisonment. There are no indications that Lagos would consider granting the East-Central State any special status in the federation. There is a remote possibility that the Nigerians would consider adjusting the East-Central State boundaries-- possibly even to include a seaport at the expense of the Rivers State .
2. Probably the most important long-range goal of those now in control of the federal military government is that of ensuring that no single tribe ever again dominates politics at the federal level. Since the military coup of July 1966, power has been held by minority tribal elements from the "middlebelt" area--the southern part of the former Northern Region. At the time of the July coup, the middlebelters had the support of the Hausa-Fulanis but this was primarily because the coup was directed against the then Ibo regime. The present aims of the middlebelters and the Hausa-Fulanis coincide, but the minority tribesmen remain determined to prevent domination of the government by the Hausa-Fulanis. In our view, an end to the Ibo problem would almost certainly mark the beginning of serious political differences between the minority tribesmen and the Hausa-Fulanis.
3. The minority tribesmen now in control of the federal government are not bent on genocide against the Ibos, and the top leaders, like General Gowon, will probably take great pains to prevent the massacre of Ibos if the federal forces ever do overrun the Biafran enclave. It is almost certain, however, that a federal victory would result in anti-Ibo atrocities by front-line troops. The extent of these would probably depend on the manner in which the federal victory was achieved. The war has already gone on for so long and so much bitterness has built up on both sides, however, that during the first few days after the "liberation" there would probably be a fair amount of retribution particularly against Ibo soldiers and probably also against civilians. After this, Gowon and his senior officers would probably be able to contain the atrocities.
II. Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba Intentions Toward the Ibos
4. There is of course no love lost between the Hausa-Fulanis and the Ibos, and even before the first military coup in January 1966 there was much pent-up anti-Ibo sentiment in the north. Over a million Ibos lived in the former Northern Region, and because of their education and ambition, they held the best jobs. The Hausa-Fulanis regarded the Ibos as pushy, arrogant, treacherous, greedy, and of course pagan. The depth of the anti-Ibo sentiment was demonstrated during the September-October 1966 riots in the Northern Region during which at least 7,000 and possibly twice that many Ibos were killed.
5. These anti-Ibo feelings have probably become more intense since the war, and especially as it has become more and more difficult to explain the federal government's inability to win a military victory. Left to themselves, many, perhaps most, Hausa-Fulanis would probably punish the Ibos severely for the secession, and given the means, many northerners might well undertake a bloodbath of major proportions. Senior Hausa-Fulani officers would probably try to avoid this, however, and Gowon and the army leaders from the minority tribes would probably be able to contain the northern troops who would come into contact with the Ibos in the event of a federal victory. It is probably worthwhile to note that thus far in the war there have been no examples of what would happen if northern troops gained control of areas of heavy Ibo population, because the Ibos have evacuated their towns in the face of advancing federal troops.
6. The Yorubas are also basically anti-Ibo. The Westerners see the Ibos as rivals for the better jobs and as cultural inferiors. Most Yorubas, however, probably feel much closer to the Ibos in education and background than to their northern brothers, and probably quite a few Yorubas sympathize with the Ibo attempt at self-determination. We do not believe the Yorubas would engage in any significant amount of atrocities against the Ibos.
III. The Ibo Elite
7. We do not believe that the military leaders intend to eradicate the Ibo elite, but neither do we believe the Ibos will be permitted to play any meaningful role in the federal government for the foreseeable future. The federal leaders almost certainly would not entrust any responsible federal positions to the Ibos. All the Lagos government has so far promised is that Ibos would control the East-Central State and that Ibos would be represented on the Federal Executive Council. We believe representation in the latter would probably be at best token, and that although Ibo civilians might be permitted to hold positions in the state government, the federal government would probably insist on federal occupation forces in Biafra .
8. It is difficult to see any peaceful resolution of the problem of the Ibo elite if the federal government regains control of Biafra . Federal leaders appear firmly committed to the division of the former Eastern Region into three states--a factor which has won considerable support for Lagos among the Eastern minority tribes. If the Eastern Region is so divided, the Ibo elite would be confined to a very small, essentially rural area. These Ibos would not be accepted with ease in the other two eastern states or the Midwest State , and they would probably be afraid to move to the northern states. The Western and Lagos States already have a relative abundance of trained manpower among the Yorubas. Under the best of circumstances the confinement of the majority of the Ibo elite would provide significant problems for neighboring states, and under the circumstances which would prevail after the war, this situation would probably be a continuing source of serious trouble.
___________________ achieve Biafra and show the difference Posts: 643 | From: Los Angeles, CA | Registered: Nov 2002
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